Operation Telic - Diary of Key Events
Diary compiled by Lt Col David King RM, SO1 O&D, Director Royal Marines.
 

The following is a synopsis of operations conducted by 3 Cdo Bde RM during the first two weeks of the war summarised from the reports emanating from various Headquarters and the media, in chronological order. It is by no means an exhaustive list of actions and many other stories are still to be told.

Preparations
On arrival in theatre, operational control of the Brigade was transferred from the Commander-in-Chief  FLEET (CinCFLEET) to that of Commander (UK) Armoured Division (1(UK)Armd Div). As such, the Brigade Commander reported through the Land Component chain of command. In the early stages. 3 Cdo Bde RM took two additional elements under command: the U S MC’s 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15 MEU) and a Squadron of CVR(T) light tanks from the Queens Dragoon Guards (QDG). Both were fully integrated into the Brigade through intensive training in the period leading up to hostilities.

Following an extensive training package in Kuwait. The Brigade moved forward to Assembly Areas in the final days before 20 March 2003. Despite having sailed into theatre with the Amphibious Task Group (ATG). 40 Cdo RM flew ashore in the days preceding the assault, leaving only D Coy aboard H MS Ark Royal to provide an immediate alternative should poor weather prevent flying from Kuwait. In addition, given an initial plan to offload the QDG by USMC LCAC (H) Hovercraft on the Al Faw Peninsular, the QDG remained at sea aboard the USS Rushmore during the initial stages.
In the immediate lead tip to the assault. 7 and 8 Batteries of 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery (29 Cdo Regt RA) were joined by a Battery of AS90 Self—Propelled Guns to form an Offensive Support Group (OSG). That OSG moved from mainland Kuwait to Bubiyan Island on 18 March to establish gun lines in support of 3 Cdo Bde RM objectives in the southern part of the Al Faw Peninsular.

The contribution f the Commando Logistic Regiment (CLR) must also be noted although designed to support the Brigade exclusively. CLR sustained most UK Land Headquarters, Units and Formations through the early stages of the deployment until those elements became self-sustaining. More specifically, by 19 March. CLR had ensured that all Brigade Combat and Combat Supporting Units were fully equipped for operations

Thursday 20— Friday 21 March 2003
At approximately 2000hrs, 40 Cdo RM landed by helicopter assault in the area of an oil pipeline south of Al Faw town with the strategic objective of securing those oil facilities before they could be destroyed by Iraqi Forces. As such, 40 Cdo RM were the first non-Special Forces troops to enter Iraq. The unit encountered light opposition from Iraqi irregular forces. Which it defeated and despite some being prepared for demolition all objectives were secured without loss or destruction. The significance of this success should not be underestimated given the ecological disaster that would have resulted from the demolition of those facilities.

42 Cdo RM advancing on the Al Faw Peninsular

In the early hours of 21 March, 42 Cdo RM landed, also by helicopter, on the Al Faw Peninsular. The unit landed to the north-west of 40 Cdo establishing a 'blocking’ position to prevent enemy interference with 40 Cdo’s objectives. Simultaneously. I 5 MEU crossed the Kuwait-Iraq border moving into the town of Umm Qasr, their objective being to secure the area to enable humanitarian aid to be landed in the port facility as quickly as possible.

The Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF) also landed by aviation assault on the Al Faw Peninsular alongside 42 Cdo RM. During the course of that move, a USMC CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter crashed just short of the Kuwait—Iraq border, killing all o board. The cause of that tragedy has yet to be established. Although there is no suggestion it was attributable to enemy action. It was with the utmost regret that the Brigade reported ilk loss of Maj Jason Ward, Capt Phil Guy. WO2 Mark Stratford. CSgt John Cecil and Marine Sholto Hedenskog from UKLF CSG and Sgt Les Hehir, L/Bdr Llewelyn Evans and OM(C)l Ian Seymour from 29 Cdo Regt RA in that accident.
Throughout the assault, indirect fire support was provided by the OSG located on Bubiyan Island together with a four¬ warship gunline comprising HMSs Chatham, Richmond. Marlborough and HMAS Anzac. Their fire was coordinated by officers of 29 Cdo Regt RA.

Saturday 22 March
40 Cdo RM continued the clearance of the southern tip of the Peninsular, including the town of Al Faw. The unit continued to meet and defeat Light opposition throughout. Of particular note. A Coy conducted a night assault against a defended building in Al Faw town during which two Marines received burns. Although serious, neither injury proved life-threatening.
Simultaneously from its ‘blocking’ position, 42 Cdo began moving west, clearing the northern bank of the Khawz-AI¬-Arab (KAA) waterway aiming to link up with the CVR(T) of the QDG who had by now crossed the border on land. The aim was to clear the bank of enemy to enable mine—clearing of the KAA, in turn to enable the movement of humanitarian aid into Umm Qasr. Throughout this period, 15 MEU continued to quell pockets of Iraqi resistance in both the town and port areas of Umm Qasr.

Following the initial landings, the additional Battery of AS9Os returned to the command of I (UK) Armd Div to Contribute to the advance of 7 Armoured and 16 Air Assault Brigades. The Batteries of 29 Cdo Regt RA moved from Bubiyan Island to the mainland and then by land to the Al Faw Peninsular.

Sunday 23 March
Having completed the clearance of Al Faw town, 40 Cdo moved north-west. Clearing the southern bank of the Shatt Al Arab SAAJ waterway which forms the international border between Iraq and Iran. Reaching their established limits in the north of the Brigade Area of Operations (AO), 40 Cdo RM joined the BRF (now incorporating the QDGJ in establishing a ‘blocking’ position across access routes to the Al Faw Peninsular to prevent enemy incursion from the city of Basra.
That position was established by last light. Meanwhile 42 Cdo continued to occupy the northern bank of the KAA. providing security for the Royal Navy's mine-hunters at work in the waterway.

Monday 24 March
An Iraqi Armoured Battalion. Comprising sonic 50 T—55 Main Battle Tanks (M BTs) advanced south from Basra into 3 Cdo Bde RM’s AO. 40 Cdo RM and the BRF, now supported by 29 Cdo Regt RA. tasked a variety of air and aviation assets in joint attacks against that force. The action resulted in over 20 enemy M BTs being destroyed with the remainder withdrawing into Basra.

Simultaneously at 0200 Hours 15 MEU commenced a move north along the Shatt—AI—Basra (SAB) to secure the town of Kaz the final 3 Cdo Bde RM objective for the initial assault. That objective was secured on 25 March. At the same time boats of 539 Assault Squadron Royal Marines (ASRM) with support from 42 Cdo RM. began clearing the waterways north of Umm Qasr.

Tuesday 25 March
Having commanded operations from Northern Kuwait throughout the initial stages, the Brigade Commander moved his Headquarters into Southern Iraq on 25 March. 42 Cdo RM and the BRE continued to maintain their ‘Blocking’ position in the north to prevent incursions of Iraqi forces onto the Al Faw Peninsular.
Having cleared the town of Kaz, 15 MEU were detached from 3 Cdo Bde RM to join USMC forces conducting operations further north. They were relieved in Umm Qasr by 42 Cdo RM. now freed from protecting Mine-Counter Measures (MCM) operations in the KAA. 42 Cdo RM immediately commenced a highly aggressive search and patrol routine across Umm Qasr that provoked a number of minor contacts with the enemy that were prosecuted without loss.

Wednesday 26 March
On 26 March 14 Challenger II MBTs from 'C' Squadron of the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards (RSDG) were attached to 40 Cdo RM to assist with maintaining the security of the Al Faw Peninsular. Together with the BRF 40 Cdo RM continued to maintain the blocking position, effectively preventing enemy forces from moving south from Basra, thereby 'fixing’ the enemy.

Mne Andy Hobbs mans the GPMG on the Az Zubayr River

42 Cdo RM continued to aggressively patrol Umm Qasr, maintaining the security of both port and town to enable the safe docking of the RFA Sir Galahad. Already laden with humanitarian aid for the region. The arrival of Sir Galahad was delayed by some 24 hours with the finding of further Iraqi mines in the waterway.

Thursday 27 March
In the north of the Brigade area, the enemy launched another armoured attack from Basra, comprising 14 T-55s. against 40 Cdo's position. On this occasion, the Challenger 2s of C Squadron RSDG, under the command of CO 40 Cdo RM, destroyed all 14 enemy tanks without loss.
South of 40 Cdo RM. 42 Cdo conducted a number of complex tasks:
• The unit provided support to 539 ASRM in a pre-¬planned clearance of known enemy locations in the area of Umm Khayyal.
• Having identified a position of approximately 30 enemy some I0 kms north of Umm Qasr 42 Cdo RM launched a Company attack against it. That assault was highly successful and conducted without loss.
• The Unit also began the process of humanitarian support by delivering water to villages outside Umm Qasr.
• Within Umm Qasr, ‘42’ also supported the Deputy Brigade Commander as he began to coordinate the delivery of humanitarian aid amid to bring a semblance of normality back to the town.

Friday 28 March
28 March was a relatively quiet day across the Brigade AO, the highlight of which was the arrival of the RFA Sir Galahad in Umm Qasr carrying humanitarian aid. This enabled the Deputy Brigade Commander to begin providing assistance to the local population.

Maj Ray Tonner and USN EOD Specialist

Saturday 29 March
The offload of humanitarian aid from RFA Sir Galahad in Umm Qasr was completed. In addition, aid convoys from Kuwait were escorted into the towns of Umm Qasr, Al Zubayr and Safwan.

At home the bodies of those UKLF CSG and 148 Battery personnel lost with the CH-46 accident on the night of 20/21 March were returned to the UK at RAE Brize Norton. An emotional and very sad occasion: the event was attended by the families of those killed. The Corps was represented by CGRM, by Pallbearers from Parent Units and a RM Band.

Sunday 30 March
In the early hours, 40 Cdo, supported by L Coy from 42 Cdo, commenced an assault on an Iraqi Battalion to its north in the town of Abu Al Khasib, some 10 kms south-east of Basra. Codenamed Operation James, the aim was to close access routes to the Al Faw Peninsular while further degrading Iraqi forces. A I5-hour battle ensued during which 40 Cdo took over 200 enemy prisoners of war including a number of Iraqi senior officers. Although sustaining a limited number of injuries from vehicle accidents and indirect fire, 40 Cdo RM suffered no deaths. The battle has been widely heralded in the national media.
Simultaneously, the remainder of 42 Cdo continued to patrol Umm Qasr and the waterways of the interior, hunting down Surface to Surface Missile (SSM) launch sites. That process was enabled by the boats of 539 ASRM and 9 ASRM (from HMS Ocean) and assisted by Z Coy, 45 Cdo RM. During that clearance, a Landing Craft (LCVP 5) from 9 ASRM was hit by a rocket propelled grenade that caused five casualties. Regrettably Marine Chris Maddison died of his wounds.
It was with great regret that the loss of Maj Steve Ballard of the UK Landing Force Command Support Group (UKEF CSG) was reported on 30 March. Maj Ballard collapsed suddenly and died whilst deployed in theatre.

Monday 31 March
In comparison to recent events, this was a relatively quiet day across the Brigade AO although 2 SSMs impacted within the Brigade area. 40 Cdo RM concluded Operation James, securing their gains, regrouping and administering the companies. 42 Cdo RM continued to patrol Umm Qasr with great determination, finding a cache of 23 Iraqi sea mines in containers. 539 ASRM. Supported by Z Coy, 45 Cdo RM. continued to patrol and secure the waterways to the north of Umm Qasr finding a number of small boats, some of which contained weapons.

Tuesday 1 April
A relatively quiet 24 hours in theatre in which 40 Cdo secured their gains of recent days in the Abu Al Khasib area, inevitably taking the opportunity to draw breath while the campaign progressed in other directions. 42 Cdo continued to patrol both Umm Qasr and the waterways and marshes to the north with the specific intent of finding the haunch sites of Surface to Surface Missiles (SSMs) that have been threatening both Coalition Forces and neighbouring nations. In Umm Qasr, the Deputy Brigade Commander and a small staff continued to coordinate the distribution of humanitarian aid to the local population. In the meantime, 29 Cdo Regt RA engaged a number of enemy mortar positions with Counter-Battery fire overnight.

In less exposed areas, units now patrolled in berets, as opposed to helmets, to defuse tension. It was hoped that this would encourage the local population to interact more readily and thereby accelerate the return of the region to some semblance of normality.

Wednesday 2 April
The Brigade commenced a rolling ‘refurbishment’ programme. In appropriate numbers, units withdrew personnel to the Cdo Log Regt RM where weapons, vehicles and equipment were serviced and individuals were able to receive centralised feeding and a period of uninterrupted rest. This did not interrupt the Brigade’s ability to prosecute offensive operations at a high tempo.

40 Cdo remained ‘firm’ in securing their most recent gains.

42 Cdo continued to patrol aggressively to isolate and destroy any remnants of resistance. The unit raided a specific objective capturing 7 Ba’ath Party activists in the process. At the northern end of Umm Qasr, a crowd of some 400 locals, seeking to loot humanitarian aid, was dispersed by Royal Marines. Measures were taken to prevent such concerns in future.

7 and 8 Batteries of 29 Cdo Regt RA remained alert in providing surveillance assets and indirect fire support as necessary.

539 ASRM moved  OC C Coy 40 Cdo briefing his men at the MMS in Al Faw a significant number of boats overland to the Shatt Al Arab waterway, which runs into the centre of Basra.

Together with Z Coy, 45 Cdo RM, ‘539’ patrolled waterways across the full breadth of the Brigade area of operations.

Thursday 3 April
C Sqn QDG were routed through Cdo Log Regt over 24 hours, to service equipment and weapons, to rest and for centralised feeding. The Brigade Commander took the opportunity to issue every man with the 3 Cdo Bde RM ‘flash’ in recognition of the Squadron’s outstanding support over the previous 14 days.

40 Cdo RM remained ‘firm’ in the north of the Brigade area of operations. 42 Cdo RM continued to patrol robustly and successfully prosecuted a small number of contacts with irregular enemy forces. Having extended their operating base, 539 ASRM continued to dominate waterways within the Brigade area.

Notwithstanding an alert posture, the Brigade seized every opportunity to defuse tension. Though a delicate and difficult balance, Royal Marines began to establish links with the population. Deliberate measures included the wearing of berets rather than helmets, the distribution of humanitarian aid and the provision of engineering support and medical assistance to civic services. Royal Marines played two football matches against local teams. J Coy 42 Cdo RM were defeated 9-3 by the Az Zubahir team and in the other, the Corps lost again, this time 7-3 to the local Umm Khayyal side. In all probability the result of conversations between young Marines and locals, it again demonstrated the quality and sensitivity of our men in understanding their environment. Notwithstanding such dents to the Corps’ sporting reputation. Such events play a fundamental role in engendering trust. Inevitably, CO 42 Cdo demanded a re-match.

Friday 4 April
During the course of the previous week, surface temperatures rose significantly across the area of operations. At this stage, troops were operating in temperatures in excess of 38 Deg Centigrade.

From the Brigade HQ perspective, the past 24 hours were spent de-conflicting and coordinating with the other formations within 1 (UK) Armd Div. Challenger 2s of the Falcon Sqn of the Royal Dragoon Guards (RDG) relieved those of C Sqn Scots Dragoon Guards (SCOTS DG), under the tactical command of 3 Cdo Bde RM.

All Brigade units were firm within respective areas, each conducting extensive patrol programmes to dominate the area, prevent activity by Ba’ath Party activists and making every effort to establish links with the locals to restore civic normality as quickly as possible. In that regard, every effort was being made to respect the sanctity of Moslem Holy sites and also in that vein, 539 ASRM established links with local Iraqi fishermen on the waterways during the course of riverine patrols.
C Coy, 40 Cdo RM spent 24 hours at the Cdo Log Regt RM’s ‘refurbishment’ centre.

This was a highly successful period of operations by 3 Cdo Bde RM. The units of the Brigade achieved all that had been asked of them and a great deal more, and this was reflected iii intense media coverage. The importance of the Brigade’s intervention during the early stages, in preventing environmental disaster in the Northern Gulf, is of particular strategic importance. Subsequently, RM units conducted operations spanning the full spectrum of conflict from full-scale warfighting on the one hand to humanitarian operations on the other. These was achieved often by the same men, on the same day and in the face of a populace from which friend amid foe are typically indistinguishable. It is a matter of the utmost pride that the Corps continues to train individual marines that are capable of such adaptability.

The Brigade settled into a more routine programme of patrolling and assisting in the distribution of aid, continuing to make its presence felt across its area of operations for very different reasons. There was a shift of emphasis from warfighting to the establishment of ‘normality’. Units went far beyond that, building relationships with the local population to defuse tension and inspire trust. This is a skill in which our men excelled and the response was most encouraging. Nevertheless, it must be clearly understood that the Brigade was operating in a volatile and fluid environment in which the possibility of contact with an irregular enemy remained a constant threat. In addition, notwithstanding tile Brigade’s good work in inspiring confidence, there remained significant objectives to be achieved. There was no illusion as to the potential for further offensive operations nor as to the Brigade’s immediate ability to adopt a more aggressive posture in order to prosecute them.

Despite the outstanding operational success, it has been a time of the utmost sadness for our losses and overwhelming concern for the families that must inevitably bear the greatest pain. Our thoughts amid prayers go to those of the Corps family who have suffered throughout this conflict.

Extracted from the Globe & Laurel May June Edition 2003