Op Haven
- The Brigade Perspective -

Now that the dust has settled on Op Haven (except for those in 40 Cdo who are probably still scraping the infamous Silopi mud from their boots), it may be valuable to reflect on the experience gained as a result of that highly unusual operation. Unusual though it was, it is worth considering that operations of this type may well become more common in the future, with multinational 'police forces' becoming more important. as small, but powerful emergent states attempt to flex their muscles.

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From the outset activity was largely determined by political factors, in particular the requirement to have men on the ground as soon as possible. The Brigade responded superbly to these demands, with 45 Cdo crossing the border into Iraq on 24 April, only 7 days after the Brigade Commander received his warning order in Oslo. Although the balance of forces was upset by the need to get troops into theatre quickly, it is to the Corps' great credit that it was able to respond with such speed - well within the normal notice to move. In a time of such uncertainty for the armed forces as a whole, this lesson will not have been lost on either the Whitehall mandarins or on the general public, who were able to enjoy almost non-stop media coverage of Royal Marines in action for several weeks.

The media were a constant feature of life and although there was occasional friction, due to their desire to see everything and our need to preserve operational security, the relationship was on the whole very good and the Corps will have benefited immensely from the coverage we received. It was largely media pressure, spearheaded by Kate Adie, which led to 40 Commando's operation to locate the missing journalist, Nick de la Casa and his two companions. Sadly, after several patrols into the eastern end of the TAOR, an area dominated by the Kurdish terrorist group the PKK, the remains of the two men were discovered. Mr de la Casa's wife Roseanne is still unaccounted for.

The PKK, with whom we had little contact, added to the complexity of the operation in several ways. On the one hand, being Kurds, the Brigade was there to help them, but a careful path had to be trodden in order that we did not provide safe operating bases from which they could attack the Turks. This was a major concern of the Turkish government and led to many political difficulties. This is now understandable when we consider that a single attack in Silopi cost the lives of several policemen. There was also the danger of our troops being mistaken for Turks and engaged by the PKK; although such contacts did take place, initiated both by PKK and other Peshmerge, no casualties were incurred.

The operation was far from simple in other respects: in addition to the ever present Iraqi threat posed by elements of two Divisions to the south of the Security Zone, the summer palaces, harbouring Republican and Palace guards, were declared inviolate. These, in conjunction with the Iraqi police who were permitted to operate in towns, were a constant irritation to the Security Forces. Units were however commendably robust in expelling any unauthorised Iraqis found within their TAOR.

The Kurdish refugees also posed problems. There was sporadic inter-factional violence between religious or political groups, and as the Coalition withdrawal became imminent, a constant fear of civil unrest directed at the security force arose. Fortunately those demonstrations which took place were peaceful, marking a genuine fear of Iraqi reprisals and, at each demonstration, they went to great lengths to express their thanks for all our help.

Throughout the operation, without lowering our guard against the threat of a military response, the main problem was to establish an environment within which the Kurds would feel safe, thereby encouraging them to return to their homes. To this end the TAOR was split into two Task Force areas. To the north was joint Task Force A (JTF A) where 40 Cdo initially operated, and where the task was to provide sufficient aid to the refugees to keep them in reasonable health and to coax them down from the mountain camps, where drinkable water was extremely scarce. 40 Commando's articles in the last issue illustrated the scale of this problem. To the south, as part of joint Task Force B JTF B), the remainder of the Brigade concentrated on evicting the Iraqis from the towns and establishing security in order that Kurds could return home. In this the Brigade Patrol Squadron, drawn from the M&AW Cadre, proved its value. Having operated for M A, where they supplied much needed aid early on in the operation, they now acted as our eyes and ears on the southern boundary overlooking the Iraqi positions.

As the refugees returned to their homes the task of providing aid grew in importance, and a number of 'Super Way~Stations' were set up. These were intended to be watering points for refugees en route to their homes, but inevitably large numbers camped nearby. This created a worry that MSRs might become too congested to allow either resupply to continue or the withdrawal to begin. To cope with the difficulties of such a complex operation we were augmented by a large number of units of varying types and nationality, several of them unheard of in our Corps' previous experience. One such was 96 Civil Affairs Battalion, an American military unit designed to re-establish the civilian infrastructure, who arrived almost immediately after completing an 8 month tour of duty on Op Desert Storm. Another was the attached American Psychological Operations Coy, boasting probably the largest, and certainly the loudest in-car-entertainment system ever seen, who reassured and informed the locals from their HUMVee's, using a combination of loudspeakers and video. One such patrol only learned they had been shot at when stopped by a group of Kurds - the sound had been completely drowned by their broadcast. On the British side, a most useful organisation was the Kurdish Liaison Team (KLT), who fielded a team of interpreters and were invaluable in establishing the needs of the refugees throughout the deployment. The diversity of the Brigade Group is illustrated by the diagram, with actual numbers approaching 5,000 at one point.

It was unfortunate that 42 Cdo had to be excluded from the operation, but once again political constraints over the numbers deployed, and the need for them to meet other commitments dictated that they remain behind.

Instrumental in helping to restore normality in the area were the civilian organisations: the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the British Overseas Development Agency

(ODA). They worked closely with us and, together with the KLT, were key members of the Central Development Committee, an organisation established by the Brigade Commander in order to coordinate the relief effort. This was well advanced by the time the coalition withdrew from Iraq, but the future for the Kurdish people there is still far from certain.

Op Haven afforded us the rare opportunity to participate in operations at Divisional and Corps level conducted at short notice and considerable distance from the home base. It has enabled us to experience at first hand the American concept of mobile operations while at the same time validating SOPs and reminding us not only of our versatility, but also of our shortcomings. While it is tempting to feel self-satisfied following the success of Op Haven we must now address the weaknesses exposed by it and ensure, through exercises and training that we are not found wanting in any future, higher intensity operations.