Operation Telic
The Liberation of Iraq
Preface by the Commandant General Royal Marines
Major General A A Milton CS OBE

The whole of the Royal Marines family will have watched events in Iraq unfold with, great pride. The vast majority of the Corps, including significant elements from the band Service and the RMR, has been involved in the past few months. The planning and preparations were conducted quickly but with great care and professionalism. The deployments after Christmas, 40 Commando Group by sea, the remainder by air, were defining moments. Even as the Brigade, and those afloat and elsewhere, went through an intensive period of preparation, often in very demanding conditions. It was still uncertain as to whether it would Come to war. This was a very testing period for all: not least those back at home. In the event the brigade were first into action, seizing the Al Few peninsular in a highly successful landing against some difficult opposition. Subsequent actions were even more demanding and throughout the area the Royal Marines were carrying out vital roles. In the latter stages of the campaign I deployed to Bahraini as the Maritime Component Commander. I had the privilege of seeing Royal Marines with the Fleet and ashore with the Brigade carrying out their duties I did so with great pride. I was particularly struck by the calm measured professionalism and restrained self-effacing manner in which they described what in many cases had been Fierce combat Indeed I believe the press reporting, although very fair about the Corps, sometimes failed to convey just how intense some actions had been. I was also particularly impressed by the fulsome praise I heard from senior officers. As I write this in the Gulf the process of returning home is underway. I know our hearts go out to the families and friends of those who lost their lives and were injured. I also know the Corps family will stand by them in the years to come. With Afghanistan last year and now his campaign, not to mention fire fighting and Northern Ireland. It has been a most demanding period for the Corps as a whole and their families in particular. However, it has also been a period of courage, commitment and very high professionalism. The whole Royal Marines family, serving, retired, friends and relations can take credit or the Fact the Corps has never been in better shape.

Foreword by the Commander 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines
Brigadier J B Dutton ADC

Planning for what eventually became Operation Telic started in September 2002 and for three mouths was based on a single Commando (first 45 Commando. later 40 Commando) and an Amphibious Ready Group. Changing enemy Force levels, together with a US request for us to take on greater responsibility led to the commitment in early December 2002 of 3 Commando Bde RM(-). 45 Commando RM was not involved: they were committed to the Operation but not to the Brigade. In the event, W and X Companies played vital role elsewhere on the operation. Z. Company did reinforce The. Brigade while Y Company held the Fort on Operation Fresco (Fire Fighting in the UK). To balance the brigade, the USMC placed 15 MEU (SOC) under command for the initial phase of the Operation.

The brigade deployed by sea and air: 40 Commando Group in amphibious shipping on 16 January 2003 and the remainder, including 42 Commando, by air direct to Kuwait between 20 January and 15 February 2003. Initially the Brigade worked direct to I MEF, but when the UK national main effort shifted from the northern approach through Turkey to the southern approach through Kuwait in early January. HQ 1 (UK) Armoured Division was interposed. We then worked alongside 7 Armoured Brigade and 16 Air Assault Brigade.

The initial operation was a complex, opposed helicopter assault at night onto the Al Faw Peninsula to seize the oil infrastructure intact and to provide flank protection to the MCM force clearing the Khawr Abd Allah waterway to Iraq's only deep water port, Umm Qasr (UQ). As the first ground force action of the war it had strategic significance. It spanned all four environmental components - Special Forces, Maritime. Land and Air without the benefit of an Amphibious Objective Area AQA to aid de-confliction.

It involved integration with the USN Special Warfare Group, the SEALs. It required a considerable Offensive Support effort including AC 130 gunships, US close air support US and UK artillery and UK and Australian Naval Gunflre Support. Following this initial operation on the Al Faw (and in Umm Qasr by 15 MEU) the brigade advanced and was involved in a series of engagements, culminating in the fall of Basra as succeeding articles tell these stories geographically and I will not attempt to describe them all here I will confine myself to a few observations. The loss of the US CH46 helicopter on insertion, which killed eight members of the Brigade and the rocket attack on the LCVP which killed a Marine from 9 ASRM were tragic.

Nevertheless, the operation overall was completely successful. Whilst the level of resistance put up by the enemy eventually proved to be quite low, with the threat being hugely asymmetric- we did not know that this would be the case before battle was joined: the left and right of arc of potential enemy reaction were far apart. Certainly, on 20 March as we made final preparations in the tactical assembly area (Viking) to launch the assault, we fully expected to be subjected to chemical attack and for the helicopters to be engaged by air defence artillery.

We had to assume a determined resistance and, at local level we met it, against some determined and Fanatical fighters. Although the enemy did succeed in mounting several armoured attacks out of southeast Basra, his failure stemmed from his inability to put together a "joined-up" all arms defence. I attribute this failure in part to the surprise engendered by the speed and violence of our assault. I am delighted that we won our battles convincingly and with minimum casualties.

Lt Col GK Messinger RM, CO 40 Cdo and Lt Col FHR Howes RM, CO 42 Cd0
with the Bde Comd at the Presidential Palace Basra

Of course we are capturing the lessons identified from this operation but there are a number of Facts and achievements, which are worth noting:

• We conducted the first conventional ground force action of the war.
• We launched a two Commando Group aviation assault.
• We conducted an opposed landing. contrary to Defence Planning Assumptions
• This was the First use of Naval Gunfire Support by the UK since the 1982 Falklands War and the first for Australia since the Vietnam War.
• The operation involved a Command and Control structure that spanned all four environmental components.
• 40 Cdo provided support to SF (in this case the US Navy SEALs}.
• 15th MEU (SOC) USMC was placed under Command of the Brigade.
• A Challenger II Squadron and an Armoured Race Squadron were integrated into the Brigade.
• Our operation involved the first ever operational use of an M3 ferry crossing.
• It again proved the sea-basing concept or aviation and logistics.

To expand on this last point. All though this was not a classic full scale amphibious landing, it would not
have been possible without the support of the ships. They provided a base for 40 Commando until 48 hours before the assault (and for one company and the majority of the vehicles and stores throughout). They also provided basing and maintenance facilities for 845 .Squadron Sea Kings and 847 Squadron Lynx and Gazelles throughout. The value of this was evident in the much higher availability or these aircraft Compared to those based ashore. Lastly, but very importantly. 1(UK) Division could not have conducted this operation without the use of the sea-based stocks. The whole Division was sustained until after the conflict had begun by drawing on the afloat stocks designed just for 3 Commando Brigade - As ever the overriding Factor in the success of this operation was the quality and endurance of the Marines, soldiers and sailors of the brigade and of all our attached units. Including the reservists who fitted into the team with ease. All our plans would have been valueless if they had not executed them so superbly with bravery. enthusiasm and cheerfulness. There was a willingness to close with and kill the enemy. The foundation of Commando training is willpower and teamwork and so it proved here. In short, our training worked.

Furthermore marines were able to adjust from war fighting to peace keeping in a matter of hours. Command training from the JCC up to Staff College provides leaders who can plan and command operations across the spectrum of conflict. We have sometimes been criticised for "gold plating" at CTCRM and I appreciate that collective training such as Tesex and Ex Black Horse, with the USMC. are expensive, but it is worth it and I will continue to defend these standards strongly they saved lives.

Extracted from the Globe & laurel May June 2003