539 Assault Squadron Royal Marines

Op Telic was 539 Assault Squadron RM’s first war Gperational fighting deployment since formation in 1984. The Unit was reinforced with elements of 4 and 9 Assault Squadrons, 10 Trg Sqn and 2 Rdg Tp RMR giving a total of 50 craft and up to 185 personnel. Additionally, 539 had, at times Australian landing craft, US Naval Special Warfare (NSW) riverine craft and UK and US FOD teams TACOM. The Squadron was intimately involved in the planning and execution of Gp Telic, with involvement from the initial assault in to the Al Paw Peninsula (APP) and throughout to subsequent riverine Gperations and patrolling to clear the Khawr Abd Allah (KAA). Khawr Az Zubayr (KAZ), Shaft Al Basra (SAA) and Shatt Al Arab (SAA) waterways. The Squadron conducted 31 continuous days of boat Gperations across distances of over 90 nautical miles, conducted three ‘Gpposed’ landings and fired in excess of 10,000 rounds of 7.62 in self-defence.

The Squadron was first warned off for Gperations in October 2002 for an ARO sized deployment. The subsequent planning and changes are history but eventually the main body of the Sqn personnel and craft were loaded onto LSLs Sir Percival and Sir Galahad departing from Marchwood. The Landing Craft Control and Tasking (LCCT) detachment and vehicle were loaded onto HMS Ark Royal in Portsmouth, LCUs with 4 Asslt Sqn’s heavy ABU loaded on to the MV Smit Enterprise in the Solent leaving a ten man maintenance/protection party to sail with the ship. For Anglia and the heavy-lift ship Passat loaded vehicles and LCVPs respectively in Mill Bay. Plymouth.

The Squadron managed some useful individual training during the Wader in Cyprus and it provided an Gpportunity for craft to be worked-up having been sat on ship during the transit. The remainder of the LCU crews and drivers that had loaded vehicles onto For Anglia flew to Cyprus, continuing their passage on RFA Sir Percival.

On completion of the Wader package the ATG proceeded to Suez and transited the Suez Canal before entering the Red Sea. A second Wader package! Ex Sea Hawk, was arranged in the United Arab Emirates for 12-15 February but by this time a compressed offload schedule in Kuwait meant that only Squadron elements embarked in RFA Sir Galahad could participate. This exercise provided only limited Gpportunity for LC rehearsals and focussed on 40 Cdo RM. It also served as the final opportunity for roulement of manpower prior to the pre-planned closed personnel manning period. In Kuwait, the advance party had established FOB Freya at a Kuwaiti Coastguard Station and received RMR ranks that had flown in to crew LCVPs.

By 8 February all Squadron elements were complete in Kuwait and had established FOB Freya which comprised manned Kuwaiti Coastguard Station operating small patrol craft and RIBs. The Squadron commenced a programme of engineering and battle preparations for offensive Gperations with deliberate individual and collective training both on LC and GD revision, including the building and running of an inshore range for firing from all types of craft. The NSW Special Gperations Craft (Riverine) (SOCRs) joined in early March from the NSW SBU 22 and these significantly improved both the Sqn’s protection and C2 particularly with the US. Accommodation was of a basic tented camp infrastructure with ORP (long live MREs) feeding supplemented by limited fresh produce. During this phase FOB Freya was, by coincidence, the furthest forward 3 Cdo Bde location with Bde EQ in Camp Rhino (within USMC Camp Commando) and Cdo Log Regt RM in Camp Gibraltar (within US Camp Coyote). This meant that lines of communication were difficult but workable with distances of 60km and 90km respectively.

MV Smit Enterprise arrived in theatre on 21 February. Crews were moved by LCVP to Kuwait Naval Base (KNE) to embark. Plant and vehicles were offloaded over beach at KNB and moved to FOB Freya by 3rd line transport. LCUs under Capt Aleck Burrell and CSgt Maudling were kept in the vicinity of KNB to assist the offload of 40 Cdo from HMS Ocean to the navy base to support rehearsals. On completion. the LCUs sailed to FOB Freya where they were anchored in the channel. On two further occasions LCUs moved back to KNB for several days to on and offload 40 Cdo from HMS Ocean and LSLs, to allow rehearsals to take place and to reduce reliance on aviation. On completion of the offload, two LCVP(5)s and their crews joined us from HMS Ocean and they were to remain with us until after the capture of Basra.

The planning was based around the main effort of I (UK) Armd Div. that Brigade was directed to secure the oil facilities on the Al Paw Peninsula, following an initial assault by NSW. Once secure the intent was to Gpen Red Beach on the APP to allow the build-up of combat power ashore and subsequent clearance of the peninsula moving north towards Basra. The use of 539 Asslt Sqn assets was to be critical to the opening of Red Beach. Intent was for clearance to be conducted concurrently landside and waterside. Landside clearance was to involve RE and ABU pax who, having flown in with 40 Cdo would confirm suitability of the beach and commence clearance of obstacles and EOD. Concurrently, LCAC(L)s would force a route to the beach from seaward using RE, EOD and ABU personnel to clear the route of obstacles and EOD. The LCAC(L) would mount from Blue Beach on the eastern edge of Bubiyan Island. which was 9 nautical miles south from Red Beach. Once Red Beach and the route to it was clear, LCAC(H)s would conduct the inload of vehicles to the AFP. hi preparation of this, four LCAC(H) were preloaded with plant and CVR(T) and returned to USS Rushmore, to allow maximum use of LCAC(H) crew working hours. On orders, the first wave of LCAC(H) were to drGp-off plant on Red Beach allowing further clearance work and to improve trafficability allowing the onstream offload of vehicles from Blue Beach.

Planning for the opening of Red Beach was complex and involved a great deal of high-level consultation between USN. I MEF, 1 (UK) Div and 3 Cdo Bde for the use of USN LCAC(14) and clearance teams. The participation of USN EOD dive teams was only confirmed at D-1. One trial and two rehearsals were carded out for the control and loading of LCAC(H)s using beaches that were deemed similar to Red and Blue Beaches. The initial assault onto the AFP by NSW assets was coordinated to coincide with strategic level targeting on 20 March. The assault by 40 Cdo to secure the oil facilities was successful and ABU and RE teams quickly identified the part of the beach to be cleared. As expected Red Beach was obstacled and mined. EOD clearance from the landside started immediately although initial attempts to force a route by LCAC(L) were prevented by obstacles and the height of tide. At first light the LCAC(L)s, under Sgt Cochrane, carrying the UK and US BOD teams commenced the clearance of the seaward obstacles. At about 1200Z having breached four lines of obstacles and within 20Cm of the land EOD teams, the USN declared they would not commit LCAC(H) to Red Beach and the clearance was halted. It was assessed by both the land and sea BOD teams and the LCAC(L)s that it would have only taken 2—4 hours work to clear Red Beach for LCAC(H). Whet, the tide is taken into account, it is assessed that Red Beach would have been Gpen having cleared five obstacle belts and a minefield by 11+35 (1st light or the 2nd turn of daylight).

Concurrent with operations on Red Beach, Boat Group 1 consisting of 10 RRC(l), 2 LCVP and 3 LCU (loaded with CVR(T)) was preparing to move from FOB Freya, to the Kuwaiti Naval Base at Bohaith (FOB Poseidon) some ten miles further north and just south of Warbah Island. The intent was to hold this Boat Group at FOB Poseidon to move into Umm Qasr (UQ) a tactical bound behind 15 MEU who were
conducting a clearance of the town. The mission of Bt Gp 1 was to dominate the waterway and then identify, establish and Gperate a crossing point on the Khawr Az Zubayr river. In addition the Bt Gp had 4 SOC(R)s attached to provide firepower and protection, they were to prove critical.

The Boat Group was ordered to move past Warbah Island and up the KAZ during the night of 21122 March. It was understood at the time that 15 MEU were on the verge of securing Umm Qasr and were moving north with elements on both sides of the rivet It soon became apparent that 15 MEU had not cleared the town. Our craft observed Abs and Cobras attack targets in Umm Qasr and infantry were fighting for both old and new ports. The Bt Gp came under sporadic enemy shell and mortar fire. As well as identifying crossing points, the Bt Gp were tasked to assist Team Gelman (a recce element of 15 MEU) who were fixed on the eastern, bank of the AFP. having taken over 90 PoWs. Several potential crossing points were identified and used to offload the CVR(T) and other vehicles, but not without bogging down several vehicles and completely drowning a CVR(T) and HMMV. Crossing point Emily was established as the only feasible crossing point and due to damage to the structure on the eastern bank was only suitable for light vehicles and only for two hours either side of high water.

On 22 March, the Squadron CP moved to landing point Miller on the west bank, the CP acted as a rebro and administered crossing point Emily for 72 hours whilst contact battles were ongoing in Umm Qasr and the requirement to establish a crossing point on to the AFP became ever more critical due to the movement of 40 Cdo north from the initial point of insertion, It was here on the first night the MC and SSM secured a battery of D3Os less than 500m from Miller, which they happened to find during a clearance patrol! For the next 36 hours the crossing point was subject to sporadic enemy fire and at least two of the landing points identified on the east bank were identified as having been mined. Movement of vehicles was constrained by tide because of the jetties used (which needed considerable RE assistance to make workable), although pax could be transferred at any state of tide. The majority of work at Emily was the crossing of vehicles, although also saw large numbers of PoWs being transferred from the east to the holding centres on the west. The crossing also formed part of the surface medevac plan and was used several times. Throughout the period craft were subjected to a senes of small arms contacts - do not ask how many GPMG rounds the LCUs fired or what they hit!

Bt Gp 2 of 10 RRC(3). three LCVP and one LCU had been held at FOB Freya on orders. This was moved up river passing through Ht Gp 1 to conduct a recce of Az Zubayr Port (AZP) and its attached Naval Base with a view to occupation by the Sqn and Bde HQ. On 24 April recces and patrols identified another potential crossing point (Anna), 12 km north of AZP as a less tidally constrained crossing of the Shaft Al Basra. During these patrols four enemy patrol boats (PB 90s) were encountered and destroyed. One LCU collected trackway and plant from FOB Freya to enhance the crossing which was opened on 25 March, allowing 42 Cdo to cross on to the APP. Anna was closed overnight on 25 March due to an enemy armour counter-attack and reopened the following day. Concurrently the Squadron began the move of remaining craft and equipment from FOB Freya to Az Zubayr Naval Base, to be known as FOB Thor in light of 40 Cdo’s move across the AFT towards the south of Basra, planning was commenced on the deployment of a Boat Group to the SAA. In preparation for this an LO was embedded with 40 Cdo HQ. Conops were also worked up for a Boat Group to work with 42 Cdo in the clearance of the marshes to the east of the SAB, north of AZP.

The clearance of marshes by 42 Cdo was carried out on 27128 March using AP, LCAC and RRC. No enemy were sighted, although several boats abandoned in the marshes showed recent signs of activity. After this clearance, reports were received of a DF of IZ naval SF radio transmissions and two arty positions having been identified by WLR from within the area of the marshes. LCACS conducted a further clearance but found no traces of enemy activity other than the boats already identified by 42 Cdo’s clearance. As a result of this, two LCVPs (1 Mk 4 and I Mk 5) and two IRC with elements of ABU were despatched overnight to set up an GP to observe any enemy movement.
On the morning of 30 March whilst conducting a further clearance of the marshes the LCVP(4) was in a block position when it came under enemy small arms fire. The ensuing contact saw the LCVP(5) hit by an enemy anti-tank missile with Chris Maddison being mortally wounded and three others receiving serious shrapnel wounds. The 2 LCACs providing the QRF were deployed to assist and came under small arms fire whilst picking up the two crewmen who had been blown overboard when the Mk 5 was hit. Cpl Hiscock, although wounded himself, recovered the burning craft to FOB Thor, some 12 km to the south. Very shortly after this contact, 42 Cdo Milan reported engaging two fast moving enemy boats from Anna, destroying one and the AP above reported seeing mortar fire land in the water.

In an effort to fully re-clear the marshes an AP conducted a TI search of the area before first light giving several potential target areas of interest and were recced by fire from the AR These were then investigated using an airborne element of Z Coy and troops embarked on IRC and LCACs. No more contact was made with the enemy in the area who were believed to have escaped either immediately after the contact or during the hours of darkness.

On I April a recce was conducted of a potential FOB location to support operations on the SAA. This was named FOB Neptune and a Boat Group of 10 RRC(l) and 10 LRC prepared for movement to this site. The craft despatched to FOB Neptune arrived on 2 April and immediately commenced an active patrol programme on the Shatt Al Arab to deny access to the waterway to enemy forces and to recce potential landing points for any future crossing of the SAA. At this time Basra was not secure and 40 Cdo were in regular contact on the outskirts of the city.

NSW had intentions on the SAA so tried to force a passage from seaward on 3 April. Within the channel, but not yet in the river, the four SOC(R) were closely crossed by Iranian Boghammer type patrol craft. The commander of the SOC(R) decided to withdraw and returned the craft to KNB. Subsequently the SOC(R) were moved to AZP by road and then underslung to FOB Neptune, Tacon (US) 539, from where they were able to support the Squadron’s Boat Group and 40 Cdo on the SAA. Initially this Boat Group was very busy as irregular forces were using the SAA to reinforce outskirts of Basra. On a number of occasions craft we>. required to direct fire or call in APs to engage enemy bunk and armour. Quickly the use of hearts and minds gained ~ confidence of the local fishermen who were only too pleas& to pass on valuable intelligence about irregular forces using the river. This denied the SAA to enemy forces.

Due to ongoing patrol programme on SAA and the potential for Operations to increase following the clearance of Basra, ten RRC(3) were moved to FOB Neptune on 6 April. These were quickly integrated in to the patrol programme 40 Cdo. At this point it was agreed to return 9 Asslt Sqn RM craft and personnel to HMS Ocean including the LCVP hit by enemy fire. The LCVP(5)s from 9 Asslt Sqn RM were escorted to Umm Qasr where they were loaded on to an LSL for onward passage to EMS Ocean. Finally the elements of 9 Asslt Sqn RM that remained with 539 departed for HMS Ocean on 8 April.

With the fall of Basra on 8 April. a Boat Group of RRC(I) from FOB Neptune moved into the Palace on the SAA that had recently been occupied by 42 Cdo. At this stage initial planning was conducted for the recovery of forces from theatre and intention was to withdraw all craft, less RRC(l), from SAA on 10 April. RRC(l) continued to Operate from the Palace on SAA until 12 April, when due to boundary changes and the handover of some of the AO to 7 Armd Bde, 40 Cdo were withdrawing to the east. The RRC(l) returned to FOB Neptune, now only supported by the 4 SOC(R). On the KAZ, further reece work was conducted for the clearance of the waterway and port and MCM clearance (one RN, 2 USN MCMV) commenced on 13 April, with one LCVP in support to prevent any interference by local fishermen. This task was completed on 15 April. Also on KAZ/SAB, 40 Cdo Recce Tp used LCAC and IRC to insert GPs into the marshes and subsequent overt clearance patrols, Further overt patrols by C Coy and Z Coy were instigated Operating from FOB Thor South.

On 14 April, 5 RRC(l) were withdrawn from FOB Neptune to return to FOB Thor to assist the eventual outload of craft. Planning for recovery was now well underway. All crab less an ARG Bt Gp of 12 RRC( 1) and mc were loaded Smit Enterprise on 22 April, departing AZP on 19 April. Remaining boats were to be loaded onto RFA Sir Bedivere with several vehicles and 04 support to return to UK support any immediate re-deployment of the ARG. We are sitting now in the heat waiting to come home.